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I. Introduction
Medicare was established in 1965 to provide health insurance
to all Americans aged sixty-five or older, regardless of income or
medical history.1 At that time, roughly half of all American seniors
lacked health insurance, largely a function of the high cost of
ensuring the elderly.2 Today, Medicare provides health insurance
to virtually all seniors, and in total serves over fifty five million
Americans.3 Medicare provides a full spectrum of medical services
to forty six million seniors as well as specialized coverage for nine
million Americans of all ages with permanent disabilities.4
Medicare has grown considerably since its inception and as
more services were added over time.5 Part A and Part B, referred
to as “Original Medicare,” comprised hospital and medical
insurance.6 Later, in 1972, more people became eligible for
Medicare, including many Americans with disabilities.7 The
biggest change to Medicare came in 2003, with the addition of
Medicare Part C, Medicare Advantage Plans, and Part D,
1. Juliette Cubanski et al., Primer on Medicare: Key Facts About the
Medicare Program and the People It Covers, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Mar.
20, 2015), https://www.kff.org/medicare/report/a-primer-on-medicare-how-doesmedicare-pay-providers-in-traditional-medicare/ (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
2. See id. (“Prior to 1965, roughly half of all seniors lacked medical
insurance; today virtually all seniors have health insurance under Medicare.”).
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. See CMS’ Program History, CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS.,
https://www.cms.gov/about-cms/agency-information/history/index.html
(last
updated Sept. 14, 2017) (describing each additional layer of expansion to the
Medicare program since its inception in 1965) (on file with the Washington & Lee
Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
6. Id.
7. Id.
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prescription drug benefits.8 In 2010, the Affordable Care Act
brought more changes to Medicare.9
These expansions have made today’s Medicare an enormous
federal program, accounting for fifteen percent of total federal
spending in 2015, a total of $633 billion dollars.10 The sheer
amount is staggering, and it comes as little surprise that the
federal government is the country’s single largest purchaser of
prescription drugs.11 Medicare’s status as the country’s largest
healthcare provider and customer of drugs have made Medicare
payments a critical source of revenue for hospitals across the
country.12
Rural hospitals rely heavily on Medicare payments to provide
much needed services in their communities.13 Take, for example,
some of the plaintiff hospitals in the cases that are the subject of
this note. Mountain Head, Arkansas’ Baxter Regional Medical
Center derives sixty-five percent of its gross revenue from
Medicare.14 Its co-plaintiffs derived forty-seven and fifty-five
percent of their total revenue from Medicare.15 These hospitals are
8. Id.
9. See id. (describing the changes the Affordable Care Act made to Medicare
and Medicaid).
10. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, BUDGET & ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2016 TO
2026, Table F-5 (2016).
11. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., NATIONAL HEALTH
EXPENDITURES 2016 HIGHLIGHTS 2 (2017), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Stat
istics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trends-and-Reports/NationalHealthExpe
ndData/Downloads/highlights.pdf (noting that “the federal government
accounted for the largest share of health care spending”) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
12. See Cubanski et al., supra note 1 (“Out of $597 billion in total benefit
spending in 2014, Medicare paid $376 billion (63%) for benefits delivered by
health care providers in traditional Medicare.”).
13. See AM. HOSP. ASS’N, FACTSHEET 1 (2017) https://www.aha.org/system
/files/2018-02/2017-01-rural-fs_0.pdf (noting that “[r]ural hospitals’ patient mix
also makes them more reliant on public programs and, thus, particularly
vulnerable to Medicare and Medicaid payment cuts”) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
14. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(“Baxter Regional Medical Center, a 268-bed regional hospital in Arkansas that
derives 65% of its gross revenue from Medicare.”).
15. See id. (“Covenant Health . . . derives 55% of its gross revenue from
Medicare [and] . . . Rutland Regional Medical Center . . . derives 47% of its
revenues from Medicare.”).
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highly vulnerable to any disruption in being paid for rendering
Medicare services.16
In recent years, many of these payments have been delayed
indefinitely due to an enormous backlog of claims at the
Department of Health and Human Services.17 Ostensibly,
hospitals are paid for rendering services to Medicare patients by
submitting claims to government contractors.18 If those claims are
denied, they enter a complex claim and appeal process that is
intended to be resolved within one year.19 A massive influx of
claims made this process completely break down, creating a
backlog of over 800,000 cases nationwide that the Department
simply could not handle.20 Statutory deadlines for processing
claims became ignored and hospitals were not being paid.21 In fact,
many claims failed to resolve for up to a decade.22 The Department
simply lacked the resources necessary to handle the claims, and
Congress failed to provide them.23
This Note will examine the extensive litigation and ongoing
controversy arising from this backlog of Medicare claims. The
central issue in these cases was whether the courts have the
authority to order the Department to resolve the backlog. Under
the status quo, the department routinely violates statutory
deadlines, as claims that should have been solved within ninety
days were not decided for years at a time.24 However, as will be
discussed below, the department could not resolve the backlog
16. See id. (discussing the dependence of plaintiffs’ hospitals on Medicare).
17. See id. (noting the backlog of claims at the Department of Health and
Human Services).
18. See id. at 186 (explaining that hospitals get paid for rendering services
to Medicare patients by submitting claims to government contractors).
19. See id. at 187–90 (describing the Medicare appeals process).
20. See id. at 187 (“OMHA still has the capacity to process only 72,000
appeals per year, a far cry from . . . the over 800,000 appeals that composed its
backlog in 2014.”).
21. See id. at 188–89 (indicating that hospitals were not being paid because
of large delays in the appeals process).
22. See id. at 187 (“[S]ome already-filed claims could take a decade or more
to resolve.”).
23. See id. at 187–88 (discussing Congress’ failure to give appropriate
resources to the Department of Health and Human Services).
24. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., infra note 33, at 2 (describing how
much time an ALJ has to issue a ruling).
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without violating other congressional mandates. This situation has
significant implications for the separation of powers: to fashion an
effective remedy, the courts had to decide whether to dictate the
affairs of an executive agency or refuse to enforce congressional
mandates.25 Neither made for a desirable outcome.
Part II will provide a more detailed description of how the
Medicare payment system works and then explain how the backlog
developed. Part III will discuss why this issue has proven so
difficult to solve. Parts IV through VI will examine the procedural
history of this issue, which includes multiple appeals and remands,
as well a considerable split between the Fourth and D.C. Circuits.26
Part VII will compare the approaches of the two circuits and argue
that both circuits should have placed far greater impetus on
Congress to address this issue. Each court here concluded that the
Department was put in a bind and could not address the situation
without additional resources.27 Despite this, Congress has taken
no remedial action and it has been nearly four years since this
litigation began.28 Without needed assistance, the courts have been
unable to resolve this crisis and no end appears in sight.
II. Medicare’s Administrative Appeals System and the
“Incontrovertibly Grotesque” Backlog29
This section will outline how the appeals system works,
reasons for the formation of the backlog, and the scale of the
problem. Section A will first provide a detailed overview of the
administrative appeals process, laying out the various stages a
25. See id. at 189 (“The remedy of mandamus is a drastic one, to be invoked
only in extraordinary circumstances.”).
26. Compare Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 57 (4th
Cir. 2016) (ruling that mandamus jurisdiction was not warranted to address the
Medicare backlog), with Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (ruling that mandamus jurisdiction was warranted to address the Medicare
backlog).
27. See, e.g., See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 187–88 (concluding that the
Department cannot address the backlog without more resources).
28. See id. (stating that Congress has not acted to fix the lack of resources).
29. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys., 816 F.3d at 50 (describing the
administrative process and appeals backlog for Medicare reimbursement as
“incontrovertibly grotesque”).
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claim goes through before a healthcare provider receives payment.
Section B will discuss the backlog itself, demonstrating how much
of a problem it has become, and how unequipped the Department
is to address it. Section C will discuss the RAC program, a
component of the Affordable Care Act that is seen as the primary
driver of the backlog. Finally, Section D will look at attempts to fix
the backlog, and why those attempts have failed.
A. Detailed Overview of the Medicare Administrative
Appeals Process
The administrative appeals system at issue is a five-step
process.30 First, after a hospital or other health care provider
performs Medicare eligible services, they submit a claim to a
Medicare Administrative Contractor (MAC).31 A MAC is a private
health care insurer that has been awarded a geographic
jurisdiction to process certain Medicare claims.32 MACs process an
estimated 1.2 billion fee-for-service clams for more than 33.9
million beneficiaries every year.33 MACs are multi-state, regional
contractors, which serve as the primary contact between Medicare
and healthcare providers.34 The MAC decides whether or not to pay
the healthcare provider’s claim.35
If the claim is denied, the Medicare Act provides a four-level
administrative appeals process followed by judicial review.36 The
30. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 185 (“If a claim is denied, the Medicare
Act provides a four-level administrative appeal process, followed by judicial
review.”).
31. See id. (explaining the first step of the Medicare appeals process).
32. What is a MAC, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Medicare-Contracting/Medicare-AdministrativeContractors/What-is-a-MAC.html (last updated Oct. 26, 2017) (on file with the
Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
33. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., HHS PRIMER: THE MEDICARE APPEALS
PROCESS 1 (2017) http://www.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/omha/files/medicareappeals-backlog.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
34. What is a MAC, supra note 32.
35. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (“The MAC decides
whether to pay or deny the claim.”).
36. See id. (“If a claim is denied, the Medicare Act provides a four-level
administrative appeal process, followed by judicial review.”).
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first step is an appeal to the MAC for “redetermination.”37 At this
level, the appellants have 120 days from the initial claim denial to
file a request for redetermination.38 There is no amountin-controversy requirement.39 The MAC is to complete a
redetermination within sixty days after the MAC receives the
appeal.40
The second level of appeal is “Reconsideration” by a Qualified
Independent Contractor (QIC).41 Parties dissatisfied with the
MAC’s decision have 180 days from the day they receive the
redetermination decision to file a request for reconsideration.42
There is no amount-in-controversy requirement.43 QICs utilize “a
comprehensive data system . . . give weight to carrier and fiscal
intermediary local coverage determinations, and conduct a panel
review of all medical necessity denials.”44 The Center for Medicare
and Medicaid Services (CMS) awards contracts to and oversees the
decisions made by MACs and QICs.45
The third level, and most important for the purposes of this
note, is de novo review by an administrative law judge (ALJ),
which includes a hearing.46 This level is overseen by the Office of
Medicare Hearings and Appeals (OMHA).47 A party has sixty days
37. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 1 (describing the
first step in the Medicare appeals process).
38. See id. (stating the timeframe for first step Medicare appeals).
39. See id. (explaining how there is no amount in controversy requirement).
40. See id. (discussing how long a MAC has to issue a decision).
41. See id. at 1–2 (explaining the second step in the Medicare appeals
process).
42. See id. at 1 (stating the timeframe for second step Medicare appeals).
43. See id. (explaining how there is no amount in controversy requirement).
44. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Qualified Independent
Contractors (QIC) Fact Sheet 1 (2007) [hereinafter Qualified Independent
Contractors (QIC) Fact Sheet], https://www.cms.gov/Outreach-and-Education/
Medicare-Learning-Network-MLN/MLNEdWebGuide/Downloads/QIC_Fact_
Sheet.pdf (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
45. See What is a MAC, supra note 32 (“CMS procures all MAC contracts
according to the Federal Acquisition Program.”); see also Qualified Independent
Contractors (QIC) Fact Sheet, supra note 44 (noting that CMS awarded QIC
contracts to eight contractors to provide reconsiderations).
46. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(detailing the third level of Medicaid appeals).
47. See id. (indicating who oversees third level Medicare appeals).
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after receiving the QIC decision to file a request for a hearing with
an ALJ at OMHA.48 There is a $150 amount in controversy
requirement.49 Critically, the ALJ is required to “conduct a hearing
and render a decision within ninty days beginning on the date the
request for hearing is filed.”50 The ALJ stage is crucial for hospitals
because the ALJ hearings are conducted de novo, whereas the
higher stages of review use a deferential standard.51 ALJ hearings
are the only opportunity for the healthcare provider to present
evidence to rebut the Department’s factual record.52 The huge
volume of appeals has rendered OMHA unable to render decisions
within ninety days, resulting in a case backlog that has reached
over 800,000 cases.53 The D.C. Circuit noted that, at the time of its
ruling, it may take as long as a decade to sort through the entire
backlog.54 In fact, the situation became so dire that OMHA
suspended assigning appeals to ALJ dockets.55
If the ALJ does not render a decision within the statutory
timeframe, the appellant may request a review by the Medicare
Appeals Council at the HHS Departmental Appeals Board (DAB).56
This is the fourth and final level of appeal before judicial review in
a district court.57 Parties may appeal an ALJ ruling within sixty
48. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 2 (explaining the
timeframe for third level Medicare appeals).
49. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 185 (stating that there is a $150 amount
in controversy requirement for third level Medicare appeals).
50. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 2 (describing how
much time an ALJ has to issue a ruling).
51. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185–89 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(noting that at the DAB stage, a hearing is conducted only if an “extraordinary
question” is presented).
52. See id. at 188 (noting that delays at the ALJ stage are particularly
difficult for hospitals, because the Department recoups funds before reaching the
ALJ hearing).
53. See id. at 187 (“[I]n December 2013, OMHA’s Chief ALJ sent a
memorandum informing various hospitals that OMHA had temporarily
suspended assigning appeals to ALJ dockets, that the suspension would last ‘at
least 24 months,’ and that the agency ‘expect[ed] post-assignment hearing wait
times [would] continue to exceed 6 months.’”).
54. See id. (“These figures suggest that at current rates, some already filed
claims could take a decade or more to resolve.”).
55. Id.
56. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 2.
57. Id.

BATTLE OF THE BACKLOG

653

days from receiving the decision.58 Parties may also file a request
to “escalate” the appeal from the ALJ level if the ALJ has not
rendered a decision within ninety days.59 This process of
“escalation” essentially skips the ALJ hearing and proceeds to the
DAB board.60 The Council must render a decision within ninety
days of receiving the appeal.61 If the ninety day deadline is not met,
the appellant may request that the appeal be “escalated” to district
court.62 Similar to the ALJ stage of the process, an overwhelming
number of appeals has left the DAB unable to comply with the
ninety day framework.63
B. The Backlog
If all of these time periods are met, appeals work through the
administrative process within about a year.64 For context, more
than 1.2 billion Medicare fee-for-service claims were processed in
fiscal year 2015.65 Ten percent of these claims, or 123 million, were
denied.66 Of these, 3.7 million or three percent of all denied
Medicare claims were appealed.67 From fiscal year (FY) 2010 to FY
2015, OMHA received a 442 percent increase in its annual number
of appeals.68 Despite the flood of claims, funding for the
Department during this period remained largely stagnant, leaving
it completely unable to adjudicate the claims in compliance with
the statutory framework.69 By the end of FY 2015, 884,017 appeals
58. Id.
59. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 186 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(outlining the escalation process providers must use to advance appeals to the
next stage including “the DAB stage if the ALJ fails to act within the required
ninety days”).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 3.
64. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 186 (explaining the timeline of the
appeals process).
65. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., supra note 33, at 3.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. See id. (“However, while the volume of appeals has increased
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were pending before OMHA.70 The Department estimated that
given its current resources and without any additional appeals, it
would take eight years for OMHA to process its backlog.71
OMHA, and more broadly the Department, can only process
roughly 75,000 appeals per year.72 As a result, OMHA suspended
assigning appeals to ALJ dockets and noted that the suspension
would last “at least 24 months.”73 By statute, appeals at this stage
are supposed to be heard by an ALJ within ninety days of OMHA
receiving the matter.74 Notwithstanding, “as of February 2015, the
decisions ALJ’s were releasing had been pending for an average of
572 days” and “some already-filed claims could take a decade or
more to resolve.”75
C. Causes of the Backlog, the RAC Program
The D.C. Circuit found that the main driver of the backlog has
been the implementation of the Medicare Recovery Audit
Program.76 The Recovery Audit program was implemented in 2010
as part of the Affordable Care Act, with the responsibility of
“identifying underpayments and overpayments and recouping
overpayments.”77 The program had an expansive mandate as
Congress specified it must have “nationwide coverage.”78 The
recovery audit contractors (RAC’s), are paid on a contingent basis
dramatically, funding has remained comparatively stagnant.”).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. See id. at 6 (noting annual adjudication capacity of 65,000 in FY 2012,
72,000 in FY 2014, and 87,000 in 2016).
73. Id.
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(d)(1)(A) (2014) (“[A]n administrative law judge
shall conduct and conclude a hearing . . . and render a decision on such hearing”
within ninety days.”).
75. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
76. See id. at 186–87 (summarizing the D.C. Circuit’s finding that the
administrative appeals process functioned within the statutory time frames until
2010 when the Department Secretary fully implemented the Medicare Recovery
Audit Program which included the RAC appeals program).
77. Id. at 186 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(h)(1)(2016)).
78. See id. (“Congress also specified certain other features of the program,
such as that it must have ‘[n]ationwide coverage,’ . . . it left the Secretary broad
discretion to determine many other program details.”).
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for collecting overpayments.79 The RAC program has been quite
successful, recovering $2.3 billion and $3.65 billion in
overpayments in FY 2012 and FY 2013, respectively.80
The RAC program has also created an enormous problem.
RAC decisions are appealable through the same administrative
process outlined above.81 The result was an enormous increase in
appeals before the Office of Medicare Administration.82 In FY
2011, before the RAC program was fully implemented, the total
number of administrative appeals was a manageable 59,600, well
within the Department’s capacity.83 By FY 2013, the total number
of backlogged cases grew to more than 384,000.84 When the case
got to the D.C. Circuit, the backlog reached over 800,000.85 Simply
put, the RAC program has recovered billions of dollars in waste,
fraud and abuse, but, it has also created a backlog of appeals “that
makes compliance with the statutory time frames impossible.”86
The RAC program’s role in driving the backlog is clear, as
forty-six percent of the appeals before OMHA originated from the
RAC program.87 While there are some other contributors, the RAC
program is seen as the primary culprit.88

79. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 186.
80. Id. at 187.
81. Id.
82. See id. (“Thus, the number of appeals filed ballooned from 59,600 in fiscal
year 2011 to more than 384,000 in fiscal year 2013.”).
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(explaining that the plaintiffs seek a writ of mandamus to compel the Secretary
to act within the statutory time frames for the RAC program).
87. See id. at 187 (“[B]ecause RAC denials are appealable through the same
administrative process as initial denials, the RAC program has contributed to a
drastic increase in the number of administrative appeals.”).
88. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., supra note 33 (listing one of “four
primary drivers” of the backlog as the “National implementation of the Medicare
fee-for-service Recovery Audit Program (RAP)”).
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D. Attempts to Fix the Backlog

DHHS has taken steps to alleviate the backlog, some of which
have been marginally effective.89 For example, OMHA has doubled
the number of cases the average ALJ resolves each year.90 It also
secured funding for seven additional ALJ’s in FY 2014, a ten
percent increase in staff.91 More recently the Department has
created a new position, attorney adjudicator, authorized to issue a
decision in any case that does not require a hearing.92 However,
attorney adjudicators have not done much to resolve the backlog.
The backlog consists of claims that are awaiting a hearing by an
ALJ, so attorney adjudicators cannot address them.93 The
Department also created its “Low Volume Appeals Initiative”
whereby service providers with smaller numbers of claims could
settle them in bulk for a specified amount.94
The Department’s successes have been limited considering
that OMHA can only resolve about 70,000 appeals per year.95 This
is completely inadequate in the face of 400,000 appeals in FY 2013
and over 800,000 appeals in FY 2014.96 The root cause of the issue
89. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 187 (“The Secretary has worked to
address the backlog and corresponding delays.”).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. See Christopher Cheney, Medicare Claims-Appeal Backlog: New Rules
Push Faster Processing, HEALTH LEADERS MEDIA (June 30, 2017), http:// www.
healthleadersmedia.com/finance/medicare-claims-appeal-backlog-new-rulespush-faster-processing (“Attorney adjudicators are a new position at the ALJ level
created this year to help clear the appeal backlog.”) (on file with Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
93. See id. (specifying that attorney adjudicators may not preside over claims
which require a hearing).
94. See CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., Low Volume Appeals
Initiative (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.cms.gov/research-statistics-data-andsystems/statistics-trends-and-reports/nationalhealthexpenddata/nationalhealth
accountshistorical.html (describing program that allows service providers with
500 or fewer pending appeals to apply for bulk settlement for 62% of the amount
in controversy) (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights &
Social Justice).
95. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(“OMHA still has the capacity to process only about 72,000 appeals per year, a far
cry from the almost 400,000 appeals it received in fiscal year 2013, or from the
over 800,000 appeals that composed its backlog in July 2014.”).
96. Id.
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is a dramatically increased workload with stagnant funding for the
Department.97 The D.C. Circuit noted that it believes many of
these appeals will not be heard by an ALJ for at least a decade.98
OMHA recognized its position, and in a December 2013
memorandum, informed various hospitals that it would
temporarily suspend assigning appeals to ALJ dockets for at least
twenty-four months.99
Congress has considered a bill to increase funding for OMHA,
as well as to reform the overall process.100 The Senate Finance
Committee has held hearings on the issue, and its chairman, Orrin
Hatch, noted that the Department cannot effectively address its
backlog without Congressional action.101 A bill known as the
AFIRM Act would provide $125 million in additional annual
funding to OMHA, as well as to other reforms.102 The D.C. Circuit
noted that “the bill remains only a bill” and at the time of this
writing the bill has not proceeded out of committee.103
Compounding the sheer size of the backlog is the success rate
of these appeals.104 The American Hospital Association performed
97. See DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERV., supra note 33, at 3 (“[W]hile the
volume of appeals has increased dramatically, funding has remained
comparatively stagnant.”).
98. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 187 (“These figures suggest that at
current rates, some already-filed claims could take a decade or more to resolve.”).
99. Id.
100. See id. (“Congress is fully aware of both the backlog and its connection to
the RAC program.”).
101. See Orrin Hatch, Chairman, Senate Fin. Comm., Opening Statement at
Finance Hearing on Medicare Audit and Appeals (Apr. 28, 2015), http://www.
finance.senate.gov/chairmans-news/hatch-statement-at-finance-hearing-onmedicare-audit-and-appeals (“The Office of Medicare Hearings and Appeals has
also taken steps to address its backlog, but there is only so much the agency can
do with their current authorities and staffing.”) (on file with the Washington &
Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
102. See Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(showing how the increase in funding combined with other reforms to the appeal
process can address the backlog issue).
103. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. CV14-851, 2016 WL 5106997, at
*230 (D.D.C. Sept. 19, 2016) (“No debate or vote has been scheduled, and the
Secretary offers no evidence that any legislative action is imminent, that the bill
has support in the House of Representatives, or that the President would sign
it.”).
104. See Am. Hosp. Assoc., 812 F.3d at 188 (“If the vast majority of these
delayed appeals were ultimately denied, they might amount to little more than
an unfortunate nuisance. The record suggests, however, that many have merit.”).
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a survey of hospitals, finding that fifty-two percent of RAC denials
were appealed, and sixty-six percent of those appeals were
successful.105 DHHS admitted that at least as many as forty-three
percent of all appeals, both RAC and non-RAC denials, are
successful.106 The success rate of these appeals, and the plaintiff
hospitals’ reliance on revenue from Medicare, underscored the
necessity of resolving the backlog.
The backlog’s concentration at the ALJ stage of the appeals
process is highly significant. HHS recoups funds after the QIC
stage, the stage which immediate precedes ALJ review.107 The
plaintiff hospitals derive most their revenue from treating
Medicare patients, therefore “they are often deprived of access to
significant funds to which they are entitled.”108 This, coupled with
hospitals’ high success rate at the ALJ level, imposes a heavy toll
upon hospitals.109 The ALJ review is also important for evidentiary
reasons. An ALJ hearing provides for de novo review, while the
“escalate[d]” review uses a more deferential standard.110
III. The Issue Before the Courts
The issue in these cases considered whether a court has the
power to compel the Department to resolve the backlog.111 On the
surface, this case seemed straightforward, as the statutory
deadlines are quite clear. For the Department to grant the relief
requested, it would have been necessary to scrap or severely curtail
the RAC program.112 If the court gave such an order, it would
105. See id. (citing a survey conducted in 2014 by one of the plaintiffs in this
case that hospitals responded to).
106. Id.
107. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395ddd(f)(2)(A) (2016).
108. See id. (describing how these hospitals have been forced to cut back
services to Medicare patients, as the hospitals are wary of performing certain
services because they are not sure when or if they will be paid).
109. See id. (noting that the plaintiff hospitals derived roughly forty-seven to
sixty-five percent of their gross revenue from Medicare).
110. Id. at 185–86.
111. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 45–46 (D.D.C. 2014)
(“Plaintiffs brought this suit against the Secretary of Health and Human Services
for an order compelling her to process their administrative appeals in accordance
with statutory timelines.”).
112. See Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185–87 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
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create a separation of powers issue.113 In most circumstances, a
court has no right to order the affairs of an executive agency.114 To
provide relief, the court would have had to make determinations of
how to allocate the department’s resources, and dictate to the
Secretary how much can be spent on the RAC program, backlog
alleviation, or other priorities.115 This potential “intrusion” on the
inner workings of an agency presented a serious risk of improper
infringement of executive branch autonomy.116
The courts faced a separation of powers issue regarding
Congress as well, as they would be deciding which of two statutes
should be enforced and which should be ignored.117 Congress
authorized both the framework and statutory deadlines for
Medicare claims and appeals and the creation of the RAC
program.118 Any significant curtailment of the RAC program would
frustrate Congress’ intent in creating it, and as noted above, the
RAC program has been remarkably successful in its mission of
recovering misspent funds.119 But enforcing the RAC program
would force the agency to violate statutory deadlines. In sum, the
courts ultimately were going to disrupt the will of Congress
whether or not they chose to grant the plaintiff relief.120 If the
courts dismissed the case, the statutory framework for these

(showing how this case is about an agency caught between two congressionally
assigned tasks).
113. See id. (describing that absent further congressional action the Secretary
would have to drastically curtail the RAC program to comply with such an order,
and that the political branches are endeavoring to address the issue).
114. See id. (explaining how ordering the affairs of an executive agency would
probably require the agency to make major changes to its operations, which could
limit the scope of a statutorily mandated program).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. (highlighting other issues with the Congress ordering the affairs
of an executive agency).
118. See id. (showing how Congress is caught in the middle because it gave
the court power to enforce the framework and deadlines for Medicare claims, but
also authorized the creation of the program itself).
119. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 56 (D.D.C. 2014)
(explaining how RACs were introduced as a check on improper payments, and
have been successful in their role, recouping $2.3 billion in 2012).
120. See id. at 45 (stating how no matter which way the courts held in the
case, the intentions of Congress would be disrupted).
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appeals would continue to be blatantly violated.121 At the same
time, if they granted relief, they would be displacing the will of
Congress and intruding into the policy decisions of an executive
agency.122
The courts that considered this issue were understandably
confounded.123 Ultimately, the crisis is not the fault of the courts
or even of the Department.124 The driver of this crisis is
Congressional inaction, specifically, failure to provide necessary
appropriations for additional Administrative Law Judges for the
Department.
IV. American Hospital Association v. Burwell I
This section will discuss the first round of opinions in the
American Hospital saga. Part A will discuss the D.C. District’s
opinion on first impression. Here, the court ruled for the
Department, holding that the relief sought would have intruded
impermissibly into the affairs of an executive agency. Part B will
detail the D.C. Circuit’s opinion that overruled the district court.
In that opinion, the court held that the District Court indeed had
jurisdiction and could provide relief to the hospitals if the political
branches continued to fail to act.
A. Original Action in the D.C. District Court: The Court Refused
to Grant Mandamus Jurisdiction or Relief.
On first impression, the D.C. District Court ruled for the
Department, dismissing the case due to the thorny jurisdictional

121. See id. (highlighting that Congress could violate the appeals process if it
dismissed the case).
122. See id. (showing that if relief is granted, the will of Congress will be
ignored).
123. Compare Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 50 (4th
Cir. 2016) (holding that mandamus jurisdiction was not warranted to address the
backlog), with Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(holding that mandamus jurisdiction was warranted).
124. See Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 188–89 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(explaining how the District Court hoped the Secretary and Congress would work
together to solve how OMHA could receive more resources).
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environment.125 The Plaintiff Hospitals had sought a writ of
mandamus that would force the Secretary to adjudicate their
pending administrative appeals in a timely fashion.126 The Court
noted the size and scale of the backlog and that it “sympathizes
with the Plaintiffs’ plight” but found that the Department’s delay
“while far from ideal, is not so egregious as to warrant
intervention.”127
The district court’s inquiry was focused largely on the
“extraordinary” nature of the mandamus remedy.128 “Mandamus is
‘drastic,’ ‘it is available only in extraordinary situations,’ and ‘it is
hardly every granted.”129 To be entitled to mandamus relief,
Plaintiffs must show that (1) they have a clear and indisputable
right to relief, (2) that the agency has a clear duty to act, and
(3) that there is no other adequate remedy available to them.130
Further, the party seeking mandamus carries the burden of
showing that its right to issuance of the writ is clear and
indisputable.131 Beyond these necessary requirements, “even if the
plaintiff overcomes all these hurdles, whether mandamus relief
should issue is discretionary.”132
Mandamus involves both a jurisdictional and a merits inquiry
that is said to “merge.”133 This is because a court’s jurisdiction to
compel a government official or agency to act is limited to specific
circumstances in which a “clear and compelling duty is owed to the
plaintiff.”134 For that reason, courts must consider the merits to
125. See generally Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 43 (D.D.C.
2014).
126. Id. at 48.
127. Id. at 45.
128. Id. at 49.
129. Id.
130. Id. (quoting United States v. Monzel, 641 F.3d 528, 532 (D.C. Cir. 2011)
(citing Power v. Barnhart, 292 F.3d 781, 784 (D.C. Cir. 2002))).
131. Id. (quoting N. States Power Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 128 F.3d 754,
758 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (quoting Gulfstream Aerospace Corp. v. Mayacamas Corp.,
485 U.S. 271, 289 (1988))).
132. See In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating the standard
of review for the court to follow when deciding whether the plaintiff should receive
a mandamus relief).
133. See id. (“To this extent, mandamus jurisdiction under § 1361 merges
with the merits.”).
134. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 50 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting
Auburn Reg’l Med. Ctr. v. Sebelius, 686 F. Supp. 2d 55, 62 (D.D.C. 2010), rev’d on
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decide whether they have jurisdiction to provide relief. If no “clear
and compelling duty” exists, then the court has no jurisdiction and
must dismiss the case.”135 As both ends of the issue contribute to
the other, the court in American Hospital Association v. Burwell136
had to examine the merits despite its reservations.137
American Hospital did not concern an agency’s refusal to act;
rather, the issue was agency delay which worked against the
plaintiff hospitals.138 In actions regarding agency delay, the issue
is whether the delay is “so egregious” as to warrant relief, a
heightened standard.139 No hard and fast rule exists as to how long
a court must wait for agency action.140 Rather, courts analyze each
case according to its unique circumstances141 and look to the six
“TRAC factors” to provide “useful guidance in assessing claims of
agency delay.142
other grounds and remanded, 642 F.3d 1145 (D.C.Cir.2011)).
135. See id. (quoting In re Cheney, 406 F.3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005); In re
Medicare Reimbursement Litig., 309 F. Supp. 2d 89, 95, n.4 (D.D.C.2004)).
136. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43 (D.D.C. 2014)
(holding the the Secretary of Health and Human Servies delay in granting
Medicare claims was not egregious enough for the Court to step in and grant
mandamus relief).
137. Id. at 50.
138. See id. (showing that the issue against the hospitals was the agency
delay).
139. See id. at 45 (discussing egregiousness with the heightened standard).
140. Id.
141. See id. at 51 (explaining how a Court must evaluate and determine the
nature of the agency delay).
142. See id. at 51–52 (listing the “TRAC factors” to use when evaluating
agency delay). The TRAC factors are:
[T]he time agencies take to make decisions must be governed by a rule
of reason; (2) where Congress has provided a timetable or other
indication of the speed with which it expects the agency to proceed in
the enabling statute, that statutory scheme may supply content for this
rule of reason; (3) delays that might be reasonable in the sphere of
economic regulation are less tolerable when human health and welfare
are at stake; (4) the court should consider the effect of expediting
delayed action on agency activities of a higher or competing priority;
(5) the court should also take into account the nature and extent of the
interests prejudiced by delay; and (6) the court need not find any
impropriety lurking behind agency lassitude in order to hold that
agency action is unreasonably delayed.
Id. (quoting Telecomms. Research & Action Ctr. v. FCC, 750 F.2d 70, 79 (D.C. Cir.
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The court found that the first two factors militated strongly in
the plaintiff hospitals’ favor.143 These two factors go hand in hand.
The first asks whether the agency’s timeline of action is governed
by a rule of reason.144 The second provides that the rule of reason
may be found in a “timetable or other indication . . . in the enabling
statute.”145 The Department admitted that the ninety day time
table provided by the statute supplied the “rule of reason,” and
admitted that the ALJs violated the statute.146 It was also noted
that these two factors have been called the “most important”
factors and that while there is no per se rule for agency delay, a
reasonable time for agency action “is typically counted in weeks or
months, not years.”147
The other TRAC factors did not support a finding that the
agency’s delay was “so egregious” as to warrant mandamus
relief.148 The third TRAC factor, for example, looks to the potential
impact on the public. Agency delays that impact human health and
welfare are given greater weight than simply economic injury.149
The hospitals argued that this factor was met, as they had
necessary assets tied up in the appeals process, and one hospital
had its bond rating at risk.150 There was a real impact on human
health and welfare as these hospitals were forced to scale back on
services.151
As noted, granting mandamus relief is a discretionary even
when all the TRAC factors are present. Here, the threat to human

1984)).
143. See id. (discussing the first two temporal factors of the test).
144. Id. at 51.
145. Id.
146. See id. (“The Secretary concedes that the 90-day statutory ‘timetable
supplies the applicable rule of reason’ in this case, and she does not deny that
ALJs are in violation of this rule.”)
147. In re Am. Rivers & Idaho Rivers United, 372 F.3d 413, 419 (D.C. Cir.
2004).
148. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 51 (D.D.C. 2014)
(citing In re Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 75 (D.C.Cir.1991)) (“Although the Court
agrees that HHS has violated its statutory framework, this conclusion ‘does not,
alone, justify judicial intervention.’”).
149. Id. at 52.
150. Id.
151. Id.
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health and welfare was deemed insufficient to grant relief.152 The
court distinguished this case with others in which more specific
and immediate threats to public health were at play.153 For
example, in Public Citizen v. Heckler,154 the secretary was
compelled to act on a petition asking her department to ban sales
of raw milk, because “[o]fficials at the highest levels of [the agency]
have concluded that certified raw milk poses a serious threat to
public health.”155 The court regarded the plaintiff’s claim as
compelling, but did not pose a severe and imminent threat to public
health.156
Given the murky TRAC inquiry, the separation of powers
issue loomed large. Mandamus relief does not necessarily follow a
finding of a violation: “respect for the autonomy and comparative
institutional advantage of the executive branch has traditionally
made courts slow to assume command over an agency’s choice of
priorities.”157 Courts do not have generally have authority to
reorder agency priorities.158 Rather, agencies are granted powers
by Congress, and are best positioned to allocate resources toward
their objectives:
Such budget flexibility as Congress allowed the agency is
not for [the Court] to hijack.”159 In the event that Congress
did not appropriate proper funding for a program or
agency, “[p]erhaps . . . Congress should earmark more
funds specifically to the . . . program, but that is a
problem for the political branches to work out.160

152. Id.
153. Id.
154. See Pub. Citizen v. Heckler, 602 F. Supp. 611 (D.D.C.1985) (holding that
the Secretary of Health and Human Services was obligated to act on the petition
banning all domestic sales of raw milk and raw milk products).
155. Id. at 613.
156. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2014)
(noting that the Department’s entire caseload is related to human health and
welfare, and that the consequences of agency delay in this case did not reach the
standard of previous cases where the threat required urgent action).
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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Ultimately, the court concluded that equitable grounds did not
exist for mandamus relief.161 Although a clear statutory violation
occurred, in cases of agency delay the delay must be “so egregious”
as to warrant relief.162 As of December 18, 2014, the court did not
find that such circumstances existed.163 The delay did not impact
public health and welfare to a grave enough extent, and the court
made it clear that “Congress is well aware of the problem, and
Congress and the Secretary are the proper agents to solve it.”164
Further, “[i]n such situation[s]—where an agency is
underfunded . . . the Court will not intervene.”165
B. D.C. Circuit Appeal: The Court Reversed the District Court and
Granted Mandamus Jurisdiction.
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the lower court and held
that (1) the district court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of
mandamus and (2) remand was warranted to determine whether
the delays in processing appeals were compelling equitable
grounds to issue the writ.166 Like the lower court, the circuit court
was highly cautious about intervening in the inner workings of an
executive agency: “[p]erhaps counseling most heavily against
mandamus is the writ’s extraordinary and intrusive nature, which
risks infringing on the authority and discretion of the executive
branch.”167 Granting relief would “probably require the agency to
make major changes to its operations and priorities, including
drastically limiting the scope of a statutorily mandated program
that has recovered billions in incorrectly paid funds.”168

161. Id. at 55.
162. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“[W]e
reiterate that the district court has broad discretion in weighing the equities and
deciding ‘whether the agency’s delay is so egregious as to warrant mandamus.’”).
163. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 55 (D.D.C. 2014).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 185.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 192.
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The circuit court saw considerable factors in favor of
mandamus.169 There was a “real impact” on “human health and
welfare,” as the court gave considerable weight to the hospitals’
claims of financial hardship.170 Baxter Regional Medical Center,
one of the plaintiff hospitals, alleged that money tied up in appeals
made it difficult to replace ICU beds, make structural repairs, or
replace outdated labs.171 The court further noted “common sense
suggests that lengthy payment delays will affect hospitals’
willingness and ability to provide care.”172
Congressional inaction played a major role in the decision as
well.173 The lower court’s decision noted that the political branches
are aware of the situation and are better positioned to handle the
matter than the courts.174 However, almost two years later at the
circuit court, the political branches had done nothing: “[w]e reverse
and remand with instructions to the district court to consider the
problem as it now stands—worse, not better.”175
If Congress fails to act or does not provide sufficient resources
to comply with statutory obligations previously issued, the Circuit
Court instructed the District Court that it could act if equitable
grounds existed.176 According to the Circuit Court “[f]ederal
agencies must obey the law, and congressionally imposed
mandates and prohibitions trump discretionary decisions.”177 The
RAC program that catalyzed the backlog explosion was
implemented by Congress.178 But Congress neither provided the

169. Id. at 193.
170. Id.
171. See id. at 193 (detailing the hardships that the hospitals alleged, another
hospital reported avoiding admitting certain types of patients who would likely
trigger an audit).
172. Id.
173. See id. (“Congress is fully aware of both the backlog and its connection to
the RAC program.”).
174. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 53 (D.D.C. 2014).
175. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
176. See id. at 192 (“On remand, the district court should determine whether
‘compelling equitable grounds’ now exist to issue a writ of mandamus.”).
177. Id.
178. Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1395ddd(h) (2012).
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means to implement it properly nor did it relieve the agency of its
duty to process standard Medicare appeals.179
The D.C. Circuit held that the clear statutory language
mandating an ALJ hearing within ninety days gave the district
court the authority to issue a writ of mandamus.180 However, even
when a violation is proven, granting mandamus relief is a
discretionary matter.181 Therefore, the district court was
instructed to determine whether compelling equitable grounds
existed to issue the writ.182
V. Cumberland County Hospital Association v. Burwell: The
Fourth Circuit Split With the D.C. Circuit and Refused to Grant
Mandamus Jurisdiction or Relief
Less than a month after American Hospital Association was
decided by the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit was faced with the
same issue involving a different set of hospitals in Cumberland
County Hospital System, Inc. v. Burwell.183 The Fourth Circuit
split with the D.C. Circuit, holding that mandamus jurisdiction did
not lie.184 Unlike the D.C. Circuit, the Fourth Circuit found that
the statute at issue did not guarantee a hearing within ninety days
that could be enforceable through mandamus.185 Instead, the
statute provided an alternative remedy, the “escalation” process
that is outlined above.186 In the eyes of the Fourth Circuit, the

179. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 193.
180. See id. (“Congress fails to act, either by providing the Secretary sufficient
resources to comply with the clear statutory deadlines it has already enacted or
by relieving her of the obligation to do so.”).
181. See id. (explaining how District Court has broad discretion when
determining equity and whether a party’s conduct deserves a warrant
mandamus).
182. See id. at 194 (remanding the case back to the lower court to reassess the
issue according to the opinion).
183. See Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 49 (4th Cir.
2016) (holding that the Medicare Act grant the right for a health system to have
a hearing on claims for Medicare reimbursement within ninety days).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 54.
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political branches were better equipped to address the issue and
refused to grant mandamus jurisdiction.187
For the Fourth Circuit, the presence of an alternative remedy
was enough to defeat the plaintiff’s claims.188 Mandamus requires
a “clear and indisputable right” to be court enforceable.189 Here,
the plaintiffs possessed a clear and indisputable right to the
administrative process laid out by statute.190 Because the process
allowed “escalation” from the ALJ level of appeal to the DAB level,
there was not a clear and indisputable right to an adjudication of
its appeals before an ALJ within ninety days.191 The
counterargument to the escalation issue is outlined above, and
centers on the fact that the plaintiff hospitals view ALJ hearings
are crucial for evidentiary purposes.192
The Fourth Circuit acknowledged that the appeals backlog is
“incontrovertibly grotesque” and “its administrative process is in
grave condition.”193 However, the court denied mandamus
jurisdiction.194
Federalism concerns figured prominently in the Fourth
Circuit’s decision.195 It first noted that mandamus is a drastic
remedy that is reserved only for extraordinary situations196
involving the performance of official acts or duties. “Mandamus is
[ ] ‘drastic’” because of its invasive nature.197 “[W]ere we to
187. See id. at 50 (“[T]hat the political branches, rather than the courts, are
best suited to address the backlog in the administrative process. We affirm.”).
188. See id. (explaining how a healthcare provider must go through the
administration process before turning to the Court).
189. Id. at 52.
190. See id. at 56 (“While the Act gives the hospital System the clear and
indisputable right to this administrative process, it does not give it a clear and
indisputable right to adjudication of its appeals before an ALJ within 90 days.”).
191. Id.
192. See id. at 55–56 (describing the advantages of creating a full
administrative record with an ALJ hearing).
193. Id. at 50, 57.
194. See id. at 57 (“[W]e affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss the
Hospital System’s claim for a writ of mandamus.”).
195. See id. at 56 (“[W]ere we to interfere at the ALJ stage, as the Hospital
System would have us do, we would be undermining important separation-ofpowers principles.”).
196. Id. at 52.
197. Id. (quoting Kerr v. U.S. Dist. Court for the N. Dist. Of Cal., 426 U.S.
394, 402 (1976)).
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interfere at the ALJ stage . . . we would be undermining important
separation-of-powers principles.”198 Both executive and legislative
powers would be infringed by granting jurisdiction:
Even if the backlog were fully attributable to the Secretary’s
mismanagement, as the Hospital System maintains, our
“respect for the autonomy and comparative institutional
advantage of the executive branch” must make us mighty “slow
to assume command over an agency’s choice of priorities.” In re
Barr Labs., Inc., 930 F.2d 72, 74 (D.C.Cir.1991). And if the
backlog were attributable to Congress’ failure to fund the
program more fully or otherwise to provide a legislative
solution, it would likewise be a problem for Congress, not the
courts, to address.199

The court also expressed skepticism that judicial intervention
would improve the situation; granting timely relief would require
simply putting these plaintiffs’ claims at the top of the queue,
hardly an equitable solution given the scale of the backlog and
number of providers that have pending claims.200 The court
concluded: “[w]e thus share the district court’s belief that the
political branches are best-suited to alleviate OMHA’s crippling
delays.”201
VI. American Hospital Association v. Burwell II
This section will discuss the second round of opinions after the
D.C. Circuit remanded the American Hospital202 matter back to the
district level. Part A will examine the D.C. District’s second
opinion which was an about face from its original holding. In line
with the circuit court’s instructions, the district court granted
mandamus relief by ordering the Department to resolve the
198. Id. at 56.
199. Id.
200. See id. (“[W]e have no reason to believe that any judicial intervention
into HHS’s administrative process, as urged by the Hospital System, would
improve anything.”).
201. Id.
202. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (holding
that the case needed to be remanded in order to determine whether the grounds
of the case, such as the delays in processes, warranted a writ of mandamus to be
used).
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backlog by a specified date. Part B will discuss the appeal of that
ruling; the D.C. Circuit found that the proposed remedy was
impracticable and remanded the matter once again to consider
alternatives.
A. On Remand, the D.C. District Court Granted Mandamus Relief
to the Plaintiff Hospitals, Deepening the Split with the Fourth
Circuit
The D.C. Circuit ruled that the threshold requirements for
mandamus jurisdiction were met and remanded the case to the
district Court to determine whether compelling equitable grounds
now existed to issue a writ.203 The district Court was given
considerable discretion to grant relief because of the failure of the
political branches to solve the problem.204 This political paralysis
was crucial to granting mandamus jurisdiction: “The record on
appeal makes clear that the situation has worsened . . . although
courts must respect the political branches and hesitate to intrude
on their resolution of conflicting priorities, our ultimate obligation
is to enforce the law as Congress has written it.”205 In the D.C.
Circuit’s view, the ninety day statutory time frame was a clear
statutory duty created by Congress.206 Its provisions were to be
followed, and therefore a writ of mandamus compelling HHS to
comply would be necessary if the political branches remained
unable or unwilling to address the issue.207
The court then weighed the TRAC factors again, taking into
account the current procedural posture and lack of meaningful
203. See id. at 192 (“Because the Association has demonstrated that the
threshold requirements for mandamus jurisdiction are met, and because the
Secretary’s other jurisdictional arguments fail, we reverse the district court’s
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction.”).
204. See id. at 193 (“[W]e reiterate that the district court has broad discretion
in weighing the equities and deciding whether the agency’s delay is so egregious
as to warrant mandamus.”).
205. Id. at 192.
206. See id. (“[T]the statute imposes a clear duty on the Secretary to comply
with the statutory deadlines.”).
207. See id. at 193 (“[T]he clarity of the statutory duty will require issuance
of the writ if the political branches have failed to make meaningful progress
within a reasonable period of time—say, the close of the next full appropriations
cycle.”).
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action by Congress and the Department.208 The main factor against
mandamus is the “extraordinary and intrusive” nature of the
remedy.209 In other words, the court believed that granting the writ
would require serious changes to the agency’s operations and
allocation of resources.210 It would specifically impact the
mechanics of the RAC program, which while problematic, had also
been authorized by Congress.211 In addition, the Secretary had
made good faith efforts to comply with the statute, and
implemented new initiatives to target the backlog.212 Availability
of “escalation” as a remedy also weighed against mandamus, but
noted that escalation “may offer less than full relief.”213
There were several factors in favor of mandamus.214 The
delays had a real impact on human health and welfare; hospitals
are “deeply out of pocket due to denied claims.”215 High success
rates of appeals were also noted by the court as weighing strongly
in the plaintiff hospitals’ favor.216 In many cases, the majority of
208. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 209 F. Supp. 3d 221, 225 (D.D.C. 2016)
(“Whatever this Court originally thought of the merits of this case, it must, of
course, follow the Court of Appeals’ direction on remand. In its opinion, that court
set out several considerations weighing for and against mandamus, each of which
this Court addresses in the subsections that follow.”).
209. Id.
210. See id. (“Granting the writ in this case would almost surely require the
Secretary to significantly alter the agency’s priorities and operations, particularly
as to the RAC Program.”).
211. See id. at 226 (“[T]he substantial discretion granted to the Secretary by
Congress ‘to implement [the Recovery Audit Program] and determine its scope’—
including to curtail it as necessary to meet the statutory deadlines—favors
granting the writ.”).
212. See id. at 225 (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192
(D.D.C. 2016)) (“[T]he Court must consider ‘the Secretary’s good faith efforts to
reduce the delays within the constraints she faces.’”).
213. Id. at 226 (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 192 (D.D.C.
2016)).
214. Id. (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 193 (D.D.C.
2016)).
215. Id. (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 2, 52 (D.D.C. 2014)).
216. See id. (describing how the high rate of appeals are causing severe
financial impact on hospitals). The court explained:
21.5% of the rehabilitation hospitals that participate in Medicare—
together had pending appeals worth $135 million. Id. at 4–5.
Rehabilitation hospitals, moreover, win 80% of their reimbursement
claims on appeal. That figure is even higher—87%— when the win rate
is calculated using the value, rather than number, of the claims,
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appeals were successful for a certain type of service, meaning that
hospitals had millions of dollars tied up in this process for years
that was rightfully theirs.217 Also, the because of the financial
burden of the backlog, “some providers are ‘forced . . . to reduce
costs, eliminate jobs, forgo services, and substantially scale back,’
all of which affects the quality and quantity of patient care.”218 The
court also noted that without legislative intervention these
problems are likely only to get worse.219
While the Department proposed some solutions that were
being implemented without Congressional assistance, the scale of
the problem was shown to far exceed the department’s resources.220
Assuming each of the Secretary’s solutions worked as planned, the
OMHA backlog would “still grow every year from fiscal year 2016
to fiscal year 2020—from 757,090 to 1,003,444 appeals.”221 This
was not the “progress toward a solution” that was sought after by
the Court of Appeals.222
Legislative fixes were also considered, including the Audit &
Appeal Fairness, Integrity, and Reforms in Medicare Act of 2015
(AFIRM Act), which if passed would provide the resources
necessary to address the backlog.223 As noted above, the AFIRM
suggesting the vast majority of that $135 million rightfully belongs
with the hospitals. But as long as the claims are tied up in the appeals
process, they cannot access those funds.
Id.
217. See id. (“That figure is even higher—87%— when the win rate is
calculated using the value, rather than number, of the claims, suggesting the vast
majority of that $135 million rightfully belongs with the hospitals.”).
218. Id. (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 52 (D.D.C.
2014)).
219. See id. (“These problems likely will worsen in the coming years because,
as discussed below, the backlog is projected to grow considerably absent
legislative intervention.”).
220. See id. at 227 (“Yet there is one more consideration critical to the Court’s
ultimate decision: whether the administrative and legislative fixes offered in the
Secretary’s briefing constitute progress sufficient to warrant pausing this
litigation until September 30, 2017. Unfortunately, the Court must conclude that
they do not.”).
221. Id. at 228.
222. Id.
223. See id. at 229 (“Combining the administrative measures and the
legislative fixes [in the AFIRM Act] would reduce the number of pending OMHA
cases to 50,000 by FY2020 and totally eliminate the backlog of pending OMHA
cases older than 90 days by FY2021.”).

BATTLE OF THE BACKLOG

673

Act has stalled with seemingly no prospects for renewed action.224
The district court stated that “it has been seven months since the
Court of Appeals issued its decision, and Congress has taken no
action.”225 In addition, the plaintiff hospitals were very skeptical
that a new Congress and President would move quickly on the
issue.226
Considering the continued growth of the backlog, along with
complete inaction by Congress, the district court issued the first of
two opinions in favor of the plaintiff hospitals.227 The first was
issued September 19, 2016, and was an order denying the
Department’s motion to stay proceedings.228 The department
sought a stay of proceedings to give it time to resolve the crisis in
cooperation with Congress according to its own timetable.229
Finally on December 5, 2016, the district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiff hospitals.230 The court issued a
writ of mandamus compelling the Secretary to clear the
administrative appeals backlog by January 1, 2021.231
In crafting its remedy, the court utilized input from the
parties, recognizing that it could not simply order the appeals to
be resolved by the statutory deadline.232 The plaintiffs first
proposed a broad effort to settle claims, deferring repayment while
accruing interest on pending claims, and imposing financial
224. See id. at 230 (“[I[t has been 21 months since the AFIRM Act was
reported by the Senate Finance Committee to the full Senate on December 8,
2015. No debate or vote has been scheduled, and the Secretary offers no evidence
that any legislative action is imminent.”).
225. Id.
226. See id. (“No debate or vote has been scheduled, and the Secretary offers
no evidence that any legislative action is imminent, that the bill has support in
the House of Representatives, or that the President would sign it.”).
227. Id. at 222.
228. See generally id.
229. See generally id.
230. See generally Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-851, 2016 WL 7076983
(D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2016).
231. See id. at *1 (“Two and a half years ago, the American Hospital
Association and affiliated entities asked this court to issue a writ of mandamus. .
. the court can finally grant Plaintiffs a remedy.”).
232. See id. (“Recognizing, though, that it could not practicably order HHS to
resolve each of the pending appeals by the statutorily prescribed deadlines, the
Court asked the parties to address in briefing the specific forms mandamus relief
should take . . . [t]hey have now done so.”).
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penalties on RAC contractors who clog the appeals system with
high reversal rates by ALJs.233 However, the court was concerned
with this approach because it believed that it “should intrude as
little as possible on the Secretary’s specific decision making
processes and operations.”234 Instead, a timetable approach was
adopted, by which the Secretary would meet yearly benchmarks in
reducing the backlog, and eliminating it entirely by 2021.235
The plaintiffs originally sought any claims outstanding as of
January 1, 2021 to be summarily paid by the department.236 This
stance could have created a “perverse incentive” to clog the system
with unmeritorious appeals, which would have to be paid by the
target date.237 The court sided with the department and mandated
only that the Secretary provide periodic reports every ninety
days.238 The Court explained that “[t]he reports should
communicate HHS’s progress in reducing the backlog and should
include updated figures for the current and projected backlog, as
well as a description of any significant administrative and
legislative actions that will affect the backlog.”239
233. See id. at *2 (explaining the plaintiff’s proposed settlements to the
Secretary). The Court’s opinion states:
Plaintiffs suggest that the Secretary should: (1) offer reasonable
settlements to certain broad groups of Medicare providers and
suppliers; (2) for some subset of disputed Medicare claims, alleviate the
financial strain on providers by deferring their duty to repay the
Secretary and tolling the accrual of interest on those claims for waiting
times beyond the statutory deadlines; and (3) impose financial
penalties on Recovery Audit Contractors for high reversal rates by
Administrative Law Judges.
Id.
234. Id. at *3.
235. See id. (describing the obligations of the Department to resolve the
claims by 2021, and that if the claims were not resolved by then, plaintiffs could
move for default judgment or some other means to enforce the writ of mandamus).
236. See id. (“[T[he last bullet point in Plaintiffs’ timetable: the suggestion
that, as of January 1, 2021, default judgment be entered in favor of all claimants
whose appeals have been pending at the ALJ level without a hearing for more
than one calendar year.”).
237. See id. (“Requiring default judgment in all such pending appeals if the
benchmarks are not met, the Secretary contends, would ‘create perverse
incentives for providers and suppliers to appeal non-meritorious claims.’”).
238. See id. (“The Secretary believes quarterly reports—every 90 days—would
be appropriate . . . . The Court will thus adopt the Secretary’s timeline.”).
239. Id.
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B. Second Appeal to the D.C. Circuit
Unfortunately, neither the backlog nor the thorny legal
questions it presented were solved by the district court’s ruling.
The case went before the D.C. Circuit again after the Department
appealed the lower court’s ruling commanding it to resolve the
backlog.240 In a two to one ruling, the D.C. Circuit court reversed
the lower court for a second time.241 The reasoning was that the
district court did not address the Department’s argument that
complying with the prescribed timetable would be impossible.242 A
court cannot compel an official or government agency to do
something that cannot be lawfully accomplished.243
Here, the Department argued that it would be forced to break
the law whether it chose to comply with the district court’s ruling
or not.244 The district court ordered the Department to clear the
backlog entirely by 2021.245 In order to do so, the Department
argued, it would have settle claims en masse, which would breach
the Medicare statute.246 The Department is required to ensure that
any settlement amount bear a reasonable relation to the amount
of the claim, as well as, inter alia, the likelihood that the
Department would prevail or obtain a recovery.247 En masse
settlement would breach these criteria as there would be no

240. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
241. See id. at 170 (“[W]e vacate the mandamus order and the order denying
reconsideration, and remand to the District Court to evaluate the merits of the
Secretary’s claim that lawful compliance would be impossible.”).
242. See id. at 162 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he Court commanded the Secretary to
perform an act—clear the backlog by certain deadlines—without evaluating
whether performance was possible.”).
243. See id. at 167–68 (“The reasoning is simple and intuitive: it is not
appropriate for a court—contemplating the equities—to order a party to jump
higher, run faster, or lift more than she is physically capable.”).
244. See id. at 167 (describing the Department’s position “between a rock and
a hard place,” either settle claims en masse without regard for merit, or violate
the court ordered deadlines).
245. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-851, 2016 WL 7076983, at *2 (D.D.C.
Dec. 5, 2016), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
246. See 42 C.F.R. § 401.613(a), (c) (2004) (listing the circumstances under
which the Department may settle administrative claims).
247. Id.
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appraisal of the Department’s legal position regarding the
claims.248
Alternatively, if the Department failed to clear the backlog by
2021, it would be in violation of the district court’s order.249 The
D.C. Circuit found that the district court failed to properly consider
the Department’s contentions.250 Before granting the relief sought,
the district court was ordered to ensure that that relief was legally
possible.251 As noted above, the Department simply lacks the
resources to clear the backlog in a reasonable timeframe.252 Even
with the department’s proposed and implemented measures to
address the backlog, there will still be approximately 800,000
claims pending before an ALJ by the end of FY 2020.253 Without
those measures, there would be approximately 2,000,000 claims.254
The D.C. Circuit remanded the case back to the district
court.255 The district court was ordered to determine if equitable
relief was possible given the circumstances.256 The original remedy
granted did not take into account the Department’s argument of
impossibility.257 The issues that supported that remedy remain,
primarily the clear statutory deadlines and lack of congressional
action.258 It is unlikely that any satisfying conclusion will come out
248. See generally id.
249. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Price, 867 F.3d 160, 167 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (noting
the Department’s position that if it used only legal means, it could not meet the
court’s prescribed timeline).
250. See id. at 168 (“[W]here a party insists that resource constraints render
lawful compliance with a court’s order impossible, an equity court must examine
that claim and, prior to issuing the order, find that lawful compliance is indeed
possible.”).
251. Id.
252. See id. at 173 (“We acknowledged HHS’s argument that it ‘lacks the
resources to render decisions within the statutory time frames.’”).
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 160.
256. Id. at 170.
257. See id. at 169 (“There is nothing mystical or punctilious about the
judiciary giving due consideration to an executive agency’s central argument—
made repeatedly and emphatically across three sets of motions, not solely with
allegations but with proffers of evidence—before issuing extraordinary relief with
multi-billion-dollar stakes.”).
258. See id. at 164 (noting that if Congress remains silent, the equities start
to tip in favor of the petitioners given the statutory framework).
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of the subsequent district court opinion. The likely outcomes are
either no remedy at all or a longer but more realistic timeframe for
the department to clear the backlog. Neither reaches the root cause
of this crisis, which is that Congress must address the issue.
VII. Analysis
The D.C. Circuit’s Approach was Preferable to the Fourth
Circuit’s, but Should Have Paid More Attention to the Underlying
Problem, Congressional Inaction.
The Fourth and D.C. Circuits took diverging approaches to the
issues presented here. The Fourth Circuit, in Cumberland viewed
the issue as essentially non-justiciable, as it would be intruding on
its co-equal branches if it provided the remedy sought.259 The D.C.
Circuit in American Hospital recognized that a separation of
powers issue would occur either way the court ruled.260 Either the
RAC program or the administrative appeals system were going to
be disrupted and would not function in accordance with their
statutory framework.261
The D.C. Circuit’s approach was more nuanced compared with
the Fourth’s. The D.C. Circuit adapted to Congress’ failure to act
on the problem for over two years.262 As noted above, this case was
dismissed when it first appeared before the D.C. District Court.263
That court’s reasoning was very similar to that of the Fourth
Circuit in Cumberland County.264 However, the petitioners were
successful on appeal, as the D.C. Circuit was moved considerably
by the fact that Congress was aware of the issue but took no
action.265 The original action was decided on December 18, 2014
259. Cumberland Cty. Hosp. Sys. v. Burwell, 816 F.3d 48, 50 (4th Cir. 2016).
260. Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 184–88 (D.C. Cir. 2016).
261. See id. (explaining the various issues the court assessed between the
RAC program and the administrative appeals process).
262. See id. at 184. (noting that as the case then stood, on appeal, Congress
was aware of the issue for nearly two years without taking meaningful action,
which made mandamus jurisdiction a plausible option for the court).
263. Id.
264. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 76 F. Supp. 3d 43, 44 (D.D.C. 2014),
rev’d, 812 F.3d 183 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (“HHS’ delay was not so egregious as to
warrant mandamus relief.”).
265. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 184 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
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and the ultimate opinion granting mandamus relief was not issued
until almost two years later on December 5, 2016.266 This delay
gave the political branches the opportunity to resolve the issue on
their own. In doing so, the court demonstrated that it was not
simply barreling into the policy decisions of an executive agency.
Rather, the court was highly conscious of the hazardous territory,
and was careful in balancing the wide array of legitimate interests
at issue. Allowing Congress and the Department this opportunity
was prudent given the separation of powers issue. However, it was
also prudent to grant mandamus jurisdiction when it became clear
that the Department was unable, and Congress unwilling, to solve
the crisis.
The D.C. District Court’s order was flawed in that it was
almost exclusively directed at the Department, while the real
underlying cause of backlog is Congressional inaction.267 The
Department has only so much flexibility. Unless sufficient
resources are allocated to fulfill both Congressional mandates
(both standard Medicare and RAC appeals), the separation of
powers issue will surface again. The court has stated that the
plaintiffs have a “clear and indisputable” right to have their claims
resolved.268 Either this right, or the functioning of another
congressional mandate will suffer, and the court will be
responsible for making that decision.
To be clear, the court cannot simply order or compel Congress
to act in a certain manner.269 However, given Congress’ centrality
to the issue, the court should have done more to pressure that body
to act. At the very least, the court could have made clear to
Congress that the other two branches were in desperate need of its

(noting that as the case then stood, on appeal, Congress was aware of the issue
for nearly two years without taking meaningful action, which made mandamus
jurisdiction a plausible option for the court).
266. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-851, 2016 WL 7076983, at *1
(D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2016), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (granting mandamus
relief).
267. See generally id. (granting mandamus relief but not mentioning
Congress beyond noting that it is “unlikely to play the role of the cavalry here”).
268. See Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 188 (stating that to show entitlement
to mandamus, a plaintiff must demonstrate a “clear and indisputable right” to
relief).
269. Id.
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assistance.270 As Congress is currently debating another round of
healthcare reform, now is a fitting time for such a warning.271 The
creation of this backlog was a result of good intentioned policy that
sought to recover misspent funds for important and costly social
programs.272 However, the execution of that policy created an
entirely new problem, which a gridlocked Congress has proven
unable to solve. The longer it takes for Congress to address the
issue, the deeper the quagmire will become for the courts. Nowhere
is this more apparent than in the fact that nearly four years after
this litigation began, it is headed to the district court for a third
time. The prospects for a proper resolution, for the reasons noted
above, are dim.273
VIII. Conclusion
Congressional inaction has placed the courts in an untenable
position. The issue brought before the court in American Hospital
would have created a clear a violation of statutory authority no
matter what the outcome was.274 The D.C. District and Circuit
courts should be commended for carefully balancing the interests
at play, showing reluctance to intervene, but also showing a
willingness to take action when it was clear that Congress was

270. Id.
271. See Trent Gillies, Obamacare was ‘Flawed’, but Here’s What Health Care
Should Look Like After Reform: Ex-Aetna CEO, CNBC (Feb. 21, 2017),
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/19/obamacare-was-flawed-but-heres-what-healthcare-should- look-like-after-reform-ex-aetna-ceo.html (describing the ongoing
attempts to reform the country’s healthcare system) (on file with the Washington
& Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social Justice).
272. See generally Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 185–88 (D.C.
Cir. 2016).
273. See generally Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, 867 F.3d 160, 169–70 (D.C.
Cir. 2017) (“[T]he District Court was assigned an exceptionally difficult
project . . . . [T]he Court needed to craft workable relief while negotiating both the
on-the-ground realities and the guidance offered in our past decision. An
unenviable task.”).
274. Am. Hosp. Ass’n, 812 F.3d at 184.
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silent.275 However, the remedy crafted was flawed as it did not
truly speak to the root of the problem, Congressional inaction.276
While there has been much debate in Congress recently
regarding healthcare reform, there is no indication that these
elements of Medicare will be changed.277 The Medicare appeals
system will continue to generate an enormous number of claims.
The RAC program, with its success in preventing waste, fraud, and
abuse, is unlikely to be scrapped by any movement to lower
healthcare costs.278 This issue will continue to plague service
providers and confound courts until Congress either revamps the
RAC program or allocates the necessary resources to the
Department to resolve this issue.

275. See generally Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Burwell, No. 14-851, 2016 WL 7076983,
at *1–*3 (D.D.C. Dec. 5, 2016), vacated, 867 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (granting
mandamus relief but not mentioning Congress beyond noting that it is “unlikely
to play the role of the cavalry here”).
276. See generally id.
277. Rebecca Savransky, Priebus: Trump Doesn’t Want to ‘Meddle With
Medicare or Social Security’, HILL (Jan. 8, 2017), http://thehill.com/policy/health
care/313223-priebus-trump-doesnt-want-to-meddle-with-medicare-or-socialsecurity (on file with the Washington & Lee Journal of Civil Rights & Social
Justice).
278. See Am. Hosp. Assoc. v. Burwell, 812 F.3d 183, 187 (D.C. Cir. 2016)
(describing the successes of the RAC program.

